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LEGAL LIABILITY FOR CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE IN AUSTRALIA: 
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Published in 29(3) Environmental and Planning Law Journal (2012)             
pp 189-216 
This article presents a critical analysis of the current and proposed CCS legal 
frameworks across a number of jurisdictions in Australia in order to examine the 
legal treatment of the risks of carbon leakage from CCS operations. It does so 
through an analysis of the statutory obligations and liability rules established under 
the offshore Commonwealth and Victorian regimes, and onshore Queensland and 
Victorian legislative frameworks. Exposure draft legislation for CCS laws in Western 
Australia is also examined. In considering where the losses will fall in the event of 
leakage, the potential tortious and statutory liabilities of private operators and the 
State are addressed alongside the operation of statutory protections from liability. 
The current legal treatment of CCS under the new Australian Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism is also critiqued. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Australian Government has unconditionally agreed to reduce its greenhouse gas 
emissions by at least 5% below 2000 levels by 2020.1 It has also adopted a long-term 
domestic target of reducing carbon pollution by 80% below 2000 levels by 2050.2 These 
targets will have to be achieved in the context of Australia’s heavy reliance upon fossil fuels 
for energy generation, in particular the burning of coal to produce electricity.3 The 
 
* Dr Nicola Swayne, previously Dr Nicola Durrant, Senior Lecturer and Angela Phillips, Senior Research 
Associate; Queensland University of Technology, Faculty of Law. The authors acknowledge receipt of funding 
from the Australian Research Council, Discovery Project 1094061 “An integrated legal regime for a sustainable 
carbon cycle”.  
1 Conference of the Parties, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009 – 
Addendum – Part 2: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, 
FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (30 March 2010) at Decision 2/CP.15, Appendix I.  
2 Australian Government, Securing a Clean Energy Future (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) at 15, 
http://www.cleanenergyfuture.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/Consolidated-Final.pdf viewed 20 January 
2012. 
3 For example, in the September quarter of 2011, electricity generation was the largest single source of 
Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions at 36% of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (excluding 
LULUCF): Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Australian National Greenhouse Accounts - 
Quarterly update of Australia’s National Greenhouse Gas Inventory - September Quarter 2011 
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implementation of carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology may assist in reducing these 
emissions,4 by separating the carbon dioxide product produced from the generation of 
electricity from coal so it can be transported to a site where it is injected and stored 
underground.5 In 2009, the Australian Government launched the Global CCS Institute with 
the intention of accelerating the commercial deployment of CCS projects within Australia 
and worldwide.6 State Governments are also beginning to impose greenhouse gas emissions 
performance standards and/or “CCS ready” standards on new coal fired power stations.7 In 
Queensland, for example, all new coal fired power stations must use best practice low 
emission technology and be CCS-ready.8 However, a more ad hoc approach has been adopted 
in the other jurisdictions where there have been instances of recommended and final 
conditions of approval requiring the use of best practice low carbon technology, mandatory 
emissions performance standards and/or requirements that the site must be able to be 
retrofitted to allow for future carbon capture equipment.9 
Recent years have seen the proposal and enactment of legislation for the approval of CCS 
projects both onshore and offshore in Australia.10 These frameworks should be designed to 
 
(Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) at 7, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~/media/climate-
change/emissions/2011-09/NGGI-Sept-quarter-2011-PDF.pdf (viewed 5 March 2012). 
4 National Low Emissions Coal Council, National Low Emissions Coal Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2010) at 2, 
http://www.ret.gov.au/resources/Documents/nleci/2010%20NLEC%20Strategy%20update%20paper.pdf viewed 
20 January 2012. 
5 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World (2007) 
at 1, http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf viewed 20 January 2012.  
6 Global CCS Institute “About the Institute”, http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/institute viewed 20 January 
2012. 
7 The Commonwealth Government has stated that it will not proceed with an emissions standard or CCS 
standard for future coal‐fired generation investment due to the introduction of the Australian carbon pricing 
mechanism: Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, Draft Energy White Paper: Strengthening the 
Foundations for Australia’s Energy Future (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011) pp xxi and 162. 
8 Queensland Department of Employment, Economic Development and Innovation, ClimateQ: Toward a 
Greener Queensland: Conditions for New Coal-Fired Electricity Generation (2009) at 1, 
http://www.climatechange.qld.gov.au/pdf/factsheets/1energy-n4.pdf viewed 24 January 2012. 
9 For example, NSW Government Submission to the Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and 
Tourism: A Cleaner Future for Power Stations – Interdepartmental Task Group Discussion Paper (February 
2011) pp 3, 6 (and implemented in the project approval for the Munmorah Rehabilitation and in the concept plan 
approvals for the Bayswater B; Mount Piper extension Power Stations, 2010); Victorian Environmental 
Protection Agency, Works Approval Issued under Section 19B of the Environment Protection Act 1970 (20 May 
2011) at conditions 2.1, 3.1, http://www.epa.vic.gov.au/compliance-
enforcement/comments/docs/20110520110000184.pdf viewed 30 January 2012; Western Australian 
Environmental Protection Agency, Bluewaters Power Station Expansion – Phase III and IV, Collie: Report and 
Recommendations of the Environmental Protection Agency (March 2010) at 17, 
http://www.epa.wa.gov.au/docs/1349/Rep1349Blue3_4PER8310.pdf viewed 27 January 2012 (note: these 
recommendations were not included in the final conditions of approval). 
10 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006 (Cth) (OPGGSA Cth); Offshore Petroleum and 
Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2010 (Vic) (OPGGSA Vic); Greenhouse Gas Geological Sequestration Act 2008 
 3 
 
encourage private industry investment in CCS projects, while protecting the public and the 
public interest.11 However, despite the agreement of the Council of Australian Governments 
(COAG) that all the Australian jurisdictions would work to expedite the introduction of 
nationally consistent regulation for CCS,12 these CCS frameworks differ significantly in a 
number of respects. In particular, differing liability rules are presented across the 
jurisdictions, creating unnecessary legal uncertainty and higher transaction costs, acting as a 
barrier to the commercial deployment of CCS technology.13 As has been stated, Australia 
“has some of the most extensive laws on CCS in the world, yet the differing positions 
currently being taken on long-term liabilities may prove a real hindrance to investment in the 
technology”.14 This article presents a critical analysis of the current and proposed CCS legal 
frameworks across a number of jurisdictions in Australia in order to examine the legal 
treatment of the risks of carbon leakage from CCS operations. It will do so through an 
analysis of the statutory obligations and liability rules established under the offshore 
Commonwealth and Victorian regimes, and onshore Queensland and Victorian legislative 
frameworks. Exposure draft legislation for CCS laws in Western Australia will also be 
examined. In considering where the losses will fall in the event of leakage, the potential 
tortious and statutory liabilities of private operators and the State are addressed alongside the 
operation of statutory protections from liability. The current legal treatment of CCS under the 
new Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism is also critiqued. This article concludes that there 
is an urgent need for further statutory reform of the CCS legal frameworks in Australia. Such 
reform should seek to clarify the key issues surrounding ownership of the sequestered carbon 
dioxide and storage sites; the scope, timing and conditions for the transfer of long-term 
liabilities for projects and the potential liabilities of CCS operators under the Carbon Pricing 
Mechanism.  
 
(Vic) (GGGSA Vic); Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2009 (Qld) (GGSA Qld); Petroleum and Geothermal Energy 
Resources Act 1967 (WA) (PGERA WA); Petroleum and Geothermal Energy Legislation Amendment Bill 2011 
(WA) (exposure draft, 2011) (PGELA Bill WA). Also Barrow Island Act 2003 (WA) and Petroleum and 
Geothermal Energy Act 2000 (SA). The Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (NSW) was introduced to the NSW 
Parliament in November 2010 but lapsed on prorogation in December 2010. 
11 Flatt V, ‘Paving the Legal Path for Carbon Sequestration from Coal’ (2009) 19 Duke Environmental Law and 
Policy Forum 211 at 220. 
12 Communique (Council of Australian Governments, 2008) at 6, 
http://www.coag.gov.au/coag_meeting_outcomes/2008-10-02/docs/communique20081002.pdf viewed 20 
January 2012.  
13 Klass A and Wilson E, ‘Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration: Assessing a Liability Regime for Long-
Term Storage of Carbon Dioxide’ (2008) 58 Emory Law Journal 103 at 123. 
14 Havercroft I, Macrory R and Stewart R, Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues 
(Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p 3. 
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COST BARRIERS TO THE COMMERCIAL DEPLOYMENT OF CCS TECHNOLOGY 
In order to encourage private investment in CCS technology, the capital and operational costs 
of CCS need to be less than the predicted carbon price.15 The costs of CCS are highly 
variable and dependent on the rate of carbon dioxide injection as well as the characteristics 
and location of the storage reservoir.16 Australian cost estimates range from $16 to $151 per 
tonne of carbon dioxide avoided on the East Coast, and $10 to $4,400 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide avoided on the West Coast.17 Effective integration of CCS with the power generation 
plant is also significant to the cost and performance impact of CCS.18 Carbon capture 
technology involves an “energy penalty” with an increase in fuel consumption and 
replacement power needed at the facility to offset the decrease in net power from the capture 
technologies.19 Fitting a power plant with carbon capture technology is also estimated to 
increase capital costs by approximately 50%.20 There will be restrictions placed on the purity 
of the carbon dioxide produced by the power plant and to-date these have not been factored 
into the predicted costs for CCS.21 One of the most formidable barriers facing the commercial 
deployment of CCS operations is the long-term liability costs of these operations.22 To be 
financially attractive, those liability costs should not outweigh the benefit derived from 
implementing CCS operations, including the predicted carbon price.23 However, the potential 
 
15 Shilling N, “Carbon Capture and Storage – An Equipment Manufacturer’s Perspective” in Havercroft I, 
Macrory R and Stewart R (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart 
Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p 32. 
16 Allinson G, The Costs of CO2 Transport and Injection in Australia – Final Report (Cooperative Research 
Centre for Greenhouse Gas Technologies at the University of New South Wales Consultancy Report, 
Commonwealth Department of Resources, Energy and Tourism, 2009) at 27.  
17 Allinson, n 16. 
18 Shilling, n 15, pp 31-32. It has been estimated that in the United States, carbon capture will increase the cost 
of electricity by 36% for pre-combustion and 81% for post-combustion technologies. 
19 Shilling, n 15, p 31. For example, the capture of 90% of the carbon dioxide present in flue gases from a coal-
fired power plant has been estimated to result in a 30% efficiency loss when using a standard liquid absorbent 
process: Feron P and Paterson L, Reducing the Costs of CO2 Capture and Storage (CSIRO, 2011) at 3, 
http://www.garnautreview.org.au/update-2011/commissioned-work/reducing-costs-CO2-capture-storage.pdf 
viewed 20 January 2012. 
20 McKinsey and Company, Carbon Capture and Storage: Assessing the Economics (McKinsey Climate 
Change Special Initiative, 2008) at 10. 
21 Shilling, n 15, pp 30-31; Contaminants within the carbon dioxide stream may interact with other contaminants 
or fluid in the pipeline or geological formation causing health and safety risks, including corrosion. 
22 Klass and Wilson, n 13 at 123. 
23 Flatt, n 11 at 220. 
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liabilities for CCS are highly uncertain and also have the potential to outweigh significantly 
the initial price paid to the CCS operator for the removal and storage of the carbon dioxide. 24  
RISK OF LEAKAGE FROM CCS PROJECTS 
Modelling the risk 
Given the presence of natural accumulations of carbon dioxide in geological formations, it is 
clear that it is possible to retain pure carbon dioxide in subsurface locations for very long 
time periods.25 However, in the context of CCS, little is known about the specific probability 
of leakage, leakage volume or consequences from any given CCS project.26 Accordingly, 
there is a great deal still to be learnt about the risks of CCS including learning through 
experimentation.27 To contribute meaningfully to reductions in atmospheric concentrations of 
greenhouse gases, it has been said that CCS projects should maintain the level of sequestered 
emissions over very long timescales of at least 10,000 years.28 Current risk modelling 
regarding the storage of carbon dioxide is seen to have a number of limitations and does not: 
 Accurately predict the geo-mechanical response of injection, including fracture 
dilation, fault reactivation, cap-rock integrity, or reservoir dilation;  
 Adequately predict the location of precipitation or dissolution, nor the effects on 
permeability; 
 Involve good modules to handle wells, specifically including the structure, reactivity, 
or geo-mechanical response of wells; or 
 Predict the risk of induced seismicity.29 
As has been noted, these and other: 
technical factors in extrapolating results of reservoir engineering models, mean that small uncertainties in 
the measurement of a storage site at the present day, propagate into large uncertainties further into the 
future… in such situations it is extremely difficult to state that there will be zero leakage in all cases.30  
 
24 Haszeldine S, “Geological Factors in Framing Legislation to Enable and Regulate Storage of Carbon Dioxide 
Deep in the Ground” in Havercroft I, Macrory R and Stewart R (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging 
Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p 9. 
25 Haszeldine, n 24, p 13. 
26 See Scherer GW, Celia MA, Prevost JH, Bachu S, Bruant R, Duguid A, Fuller R, Gasda SE, Radonjic M, 
Vichit-Vadakan W,, ‘Leakage of CO2 through Abandoned Wells: Role of Corrosion of Cement’ in Benson S 
and Thomas D (eds) Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Deep Geologic Formations – Results from the 
CO2 Capture Project, Volume 2 (Elsevier, London, 2005) p 827. 
27 Haszeldine, n 24, p 17. 
28 Haszeldine, n 24, p 9. 
29 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, n 5, p 51.  
30 Haszeldine, n 24, p 13. 
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Risks of leakage and harm  
During the injection and operation phases, the injected liquid carbon dioxide poses the 
highest risk of escape and must be physically contained.31 Over the first years to decades, 
some residual saturation trapping may occur as small bubbles of carbon dioxide become 
trapped within the pores of the reservoir.32 Where injection has occurred into saline 
formations, the injected carbon dioxide will tend to migrate upwards and laterally owing to 
the density of the carbon dioxide being less than the density of the saline water within the 
formation.33 During the first decades to thousands of years, the injected carbon dioxide will 
begin to dissolve into the subsurface brine and sink below the original brine water.34  
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has stated that the fraction of carbon 
dioxide retained in appropriately selected and managed geological reservoirs is “very likely” 
to exceed 99% over  100 years and “likely” to exceed 99% over 1,000 years.35 The question 
then becomes whether the predicted loss of 1% of carbon dioxide in a 1000 year period is 
“acceptable” from a regulatory viewpoint. It has been stated that “expecting, and legislating 
for, total security of storage is unreasonable” given the impossibility of being able to 
guarantee 100% containment into the indefinite future.36  
Leakage could result in the carbon dioxide migrating into linked subsurface saline reservoirs; 
unlinked subsurface reservoirs (through faults or fractures) including groundwater reservoirs; 
adjacent hydrocarbon or mineral formations or up onto the surface of the land.37 These areas 
may reside outside the license area for the CCS project.38 The potential loss and harm 
 
31 Haszeldine, n 24, p 15. 
32 Haszeldine, n 24, p 15. 
33 De Figueiredo M and Wilson E, 'Geological Carbon Dioxide Sequestration: An Analysis of Subsurface 
Property Law' (2006) 36 (2) Environmental Law Reporter 10114 at 10115; Jacobs W and Stump D, Proposed 
Liability Framework for Geological Sequestration of Carbon Dioxide (Harvard University, Emmett 
Environmental Law & Policy Clinic, 2010) at Appendix B: Risks of Geological Sequestration, 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/elp/ccsappendix-b.pdf viewed 30 January 2012. 
34 Haszeldine, n 24, pp 15-16. 
35 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Special Report on Carbon Dioxide and Storage: 
Summary for Policy Makers and Technical Summary (Approved and Accepted by IPCC Working Group III and 
24th Session of the IPCC, Montreal, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2005) at 14.  
36 Haszeldine, n 24, pp 14, 17. An alternative, more pragmatic, suggestion has been to legislate in a manner that 
accommodates small-scale leakage, p 22. 
37 LoBaugh L, “Legal and Regulatory Challenges of Geological Carbon Capture and Sequestration: US Hurdles 
to Reducing CO2 Emissions” in Havercroft I, Macrory R and Stewart R (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: 
Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p 73. 
38 Haszeldine, n 24, p 17. 
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resulting from the unexpected migration of the carbon dioxide could include a number of 
matters, such as:39  
 Changes in subsurface pressure, due to the “pressure pulse” generated by the carbon 
dioxide injection, could lead to induced seismic activity, ground heave or fracturing of 
the reservoir seal.40 
 Groundwater contamination. The movement of brine from the storage reservoir into 
fresh water formations could pollute local groundwater sources.41 Contaminates 
within the injected substance may also contaminate groundwater sources.42  
 Carbon dioxide escaping to the surface could cause adverse impacts to natural 
resources, such as forests and vegetation, as well as impacting on atmospheric health 
(climate change). Migration could also alter the pH of subsurface water, leading to 
mobilisation of metals and/or organic compounds.43 Damage may also be caused to 
properties in the vicinity of the sequestration site.44 
 Migration of the carbon dioxide, or the pressure front, could cause loss or damage to 
adjacent mineral reserves and/or oil and gas reservoirs.45 
In some instances, there may also be a risk of localised explosion where there is an abrupt 
leakage of carbon dioxide from the site into the local environment.46 However, the 
occurrence of gradual or diffuse pollution seems to be a much higher risk for CCS projects. 
 
OWNERSHIP OF THE GAS, PORE SPACE AND CCS INFRASTRUCTURE 
A fundamental prerequisite for the broad commercial deployment of CCS technology in 
Australia is the presence of clear property rights with indeterminate or fragmented ownership 
 
39 Jacobs and Stump, n 33. 
40 See Wilson E, DeFigueiredo MA, Trabucchi C, Larsen K, ‘Liability and Financial Responsibility Frameworks 
for Carbon Capture and Sequestration’ (December 2007) 3 World Resources Institute Issue Brief: Carbon 
Capture and Sequestration 1 at 3, 4; Haszeldine, n 24, p 16. 
41 Haszeldine, n 24, p 16; see also Bachu S, Celia M and Gasda S, ‘Spatial Characterization of the Location of 
Potentially Leaky Wells Penetrating a Deep Saline Aquifer in a Mature Sedimentary Basin’ (2004) 46 (6-7) 
Environmental Geology 707 at 708; Wilson et al, n 40 at 3.  
42 Jacobs and Stump, n 33 at B-2. 
43 Wilson et al, n 40 at 3. 
44 International Risk Governance Council, Policy Brief: Regulation of Carbon Capture and Storage (2008) at 
10, http://www.irgc.org/IMG/pdf/Policy_Brief_CCS.pdf viewed 20 January 2012. 
45 Jacobs and Stump, n 33 at B-2. 
46 The IPCC considers that concentrations greater than 7 to 10% of carbon dioxide in the air would pose 
immediate dangers to human life and health, IPCC, n 35 at 31; McLaren J and Fahey J, ‘Key Legal and 
Regulatory Considerations for the Geosequestration of Carbon Dioxide in Australia’ (2005) 24 Australian 
Resources and Energy Law Journal 45 at 51. 
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likely to affect project site selection.47 There are a number of components to a CCS site that 
will be the subject of ownership by different parties. These include the pore space, 
sequestered gas, and associated infrastructure such as wells, pipelines and other equipment. 
Ownership of these different items could be vested in the landowner (where the project 
occurs on private land); the Crown as the owner of public land; the CCS project operator; or, 
in the case of the sequestered gas, the original generator of the emissions. The current CCS 
legislation adopts very different approaches to addressing ownership of these components. In 
some jurisdictions ownership is specifically conferred while in others the legislation remains 
silent.  
Ownership of the Equipment and Infrastructure 
The Queensland CCS legislation explicitly states who owns the equipment and 
improvements, wells and pipelines across the various stages of the CCS project. During the 
injection and storage phases, all equipment and improvements, other than pipelines,48 remain 
the property of the person who had ownership of them before they were placed at the CCS 
site.49 When the pipelines are located within the relevant tenure area, they will be the 
personal property of the CCS operator,50 including after the tenure has ended.51 Once the 
pipeline has been decommissioned52 the operator will have the option of transferring 
ownership to a third party.53 All equipment or improvements, other than wells, must be 
removed before the relevant tenure ends.54 The CCS operator must decommission any wells 
at which point the wells are transferred to the Crown.55 Despite this, the legislation expressly 
states that responsibility for the wells will remain with the CCS operator until the end of the 
relevant tenure for the project or removal of the relevant land from the tenure area.56 The 
other CCS frameworks remain silent on these matters of ownership of the relevant 
infrastructure, equipment, pipelines and wells across the life of the CCS project leaving these 
matters to be addressed through alternative legal mechanisms. 
 
47 Krupa H, “The Legal Framework for Carbon Capture and Storage in Canada” in Havercroft I, Macrory R and 
Stewart R (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford, 2011) p 50. 
48 GGSA Qld, s 326(2). 
49 GGSA Qld, s 327. 
50 GGSA Qld, s 250. 
51 GGSA Qld, s 251. 
52 GGSA Qld, s 252. 
53 GGSA Qld, s 251(4). 
54 GGSA Qld, s 334. 
55 GGSA Qld, s 269(3). 
56 GGSA Qld, s 269(2). 
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Ownership of the gas and the pore space 
In most Australian jurisdictions, the CCS storage formation, or pore space, is owned by the 
Crown.57 This ownership extends from the commencement of injection and storage activities 
through to site closure and beyond. However, the Commonwealth CCS legislation remains 
silent on the issue of ownership of the pore space. Ownership of the sequestered gas varies at 
different points in time throughout the life of the CCS project. All of the Australian 
jurisdictions are silent on who owns the sequestered gas during the injection and storage 
phases of the CCS project. Following site closure and the surrender of the relevant lease or 
licence, the Queensland and Victorian legislation addresses ownership of the sequestered 
gas.58 In Victoria, the Crown becomes the owner of the injected gas59 while in Queensland 
the gas becomes the property of the Crown.60 The Commonwealth and Western Australian 
CCS frameworks remain silent on ownership throughout the project. 
 
Common law considerations of ownership  
The lack of clarity provided in the legislation means that ownership of the sequestered carbon 
dioxide must be determined by common law principles including the common law doctrine of 
fixtures and chattels. This doctrine states that a chattel brought onto land, once affixed to the 
land in accordance with established legal principles, by implication of law becomes a fixture 
and therefore part of the land owner’s property.61 If an item is affixed to land then it is 
presumed to be a fixture.62 If it is not affixed in any way but merely rests by its own weight, it 
is presumed not be a fixture.63 These presumptions can be rebutted with evidence of the 
objective intention of the parties, determined by an examination of all of the surrounding 
 
57 GGSA Qld, s 27; GGGSA Vic, s 14; OPGGSA Vic, s 65; PGERA WA, proposed s 9; PGELA Bill WA, cl 9.  
58 GGGSA Vic, s 16; OPGGSA Vic, s 67; GGSA Qld, s 181(1). 
59 GGGSA Vic, s 16; OPGGSA Vic, s 67. 
60 GGSA Qld, s 181(2).  
61 North Shore Gas Co Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (NSW) (1940) 63 CLR 52 at 68 per Dixon J. 
62 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 at 334-335; Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo 
(1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 at 712.  
63 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 at 334-335; Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo 
(1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 at 712.  
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circumstances.64 Tests have been developed for determining the objective intention of the 
parties including: 
 Whether the item is attached to the land for the better use and enjoyment of the land 
or the better use and enjoyment of the item;65 
 Whether the item can be removed without substantial damage to the land or the 
item;66 
 Whether the item was affixed with the intent to remain in position permanently or for 
an indefinite or substantial period; or only for some temporary purpose;67 and 
 The costs of removal and economic incentives for removal of item.68 
 
In applying these principles to the sequestered carbon dioxide the Court will have to 
determine whether the sequestered carbon dioxide is affixed to the land by more than its own 
weight. Sequestered carbon dioxide is located in the subsurface of the land and held in place 
by the boundaries and trapping mechanisms of the storage formation and, in some cases, 
chemical reactions occurring within the storage formation. While the sequestered carbon 
dioxide is initially in a supercritical state, over time the stored carbon dioxide is “dominated 
by residual saturation and dissolution” meaning that it cannot be re-extracted from the site.69 
In those circumstances, the sequestered carbon dioxide is affixed to the sub-surface land by 
more than its own weight and is prima facie presumed to be a fixture.70 In other 
circumstances where the carbon dioxide is sequestered in large, hollow storage formations 
and is floating in a gaseous state then this seems less likely to be the case. 
 
 
64 Palumberi v Palumberi [1986] NSW ConvR 55-287 at 56,671; Farley v Hawkins [1997] 2 Qd R 361.  
65 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328; Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR 
(NSW) 700. 
66 Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700; May v Ceedive Pty Ltd (2006) 
13 BPR 24, 147 at [72].  
67 Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo (1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 at 712-713 per Sir Frederick 
Jordan.  
68 Metal Manufacturers Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1999) 99 ATC 5229; Litz v National Australia 
Bank Ltd [1986] ANZ ConvR 883.  
69 Haszeldine, n 24, p 19. 
70 Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 at 334-335; Australian Provincial Assurance Co Ltd v Coroneo 
(1938) 38 SR (NSW) 700 at 712. 
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These presumptions are open to rebuttal given the surrounding circumstances and evidence of 
the objective intention of the parties at the time when the item was put in place.71 It may be 
that the carbon dioxide was sequestered for the better use and enjoyment of the carbon 
dioxide, rather than the land, which will point towards the substance being characterised as a 
chattel. On the other hand, if the carbon dioxide has been sequestered with the intention that 
it remains under the land permanently then this would be more likely to indicate that the 
substance is a fixture. The fact that the sequestered carbon dioxide cannot be physically 
separated from the land is also a strong indication it will become a fixture.  
The above analysis illustrates how these traditional property doctrines for fixtures and 
chattels have the potential to create significant uncertainty and high transaction costs for 
those parties attempting to clarify whether ownership of the sequestered carbon dioxide is 
vested in the land holder or the project operator during the life of the CCS project.72 In an 
effort to limit civil liability, we may well see increasing reliance on contractual provisions to 
clarify who retains the ownership and risk for the carbon dioxide as it is transferred, injected 
and stored, prior to the Crown taking on ownership and responsibility for the CCS site.73 
However, it would be much more preferable for these matters to be clarified through clear 
provisions within the CCS legislation rather than relying on the application of these broad 
common law doctrines.  
 
POTENTIAL TORTIOUS LIABILITIES FOR LEAKAGE AND MIGRATION OF CARBON DIOXIDE 
Matters of ownership will be relevant to questions of common law liability for any harm 
caused in the event of leakage, although this is just a starting point for determining legal 
responsibility. The uncontrolled migration of the injected carbon dioxide could lead to 
potential claims in tort against the operator of the CCS site including claims in trespass, 
nuisance and negligence. Queensland is the only jurisdiction to provide owners and occupiers 
with complete protection from any claims in tortious liability from the presence of CCS 
projects on their land. The legislation states that “the owner or occupier is not civilly liable to 
anyone else for a claim based in tort for damages” relating to the carrying out of an activity 
 
71Pegasus Gold v Metso Minerals (2003) 16 NTLR 54 at 61; May v Ceedive Pty Ltd (2006) 13 BPR 24, 147 at 
24, 156.  
72 Butt P, ‘Moot Point: Fixtures and Chattels – Mutually Exclusive Terms?’ (1981) 55 ALJ 756 at 756. 
73 Campbell G, ‘Carbon Capture and Storage: Legislative Approaches to Liability – Managing Long Term 
Obligations and Liabilities’ (2009) AMPLA Yearbook 324 at 344; Krupa, n 47, p 60. 
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on their land provided they have not caused, or contributed to, the harm that is the subject of 
the claim.74 The Victorian legislation provides limited protection for occupiers of land on 
which a project is carried out and states that the holder of a greenhouse gas authority is taken 
to be the occupier for the purposes of establishing common law liability.75 
 
Migration of sequestered gases and actions in trespass 
Trespass may occur through the unauthorised entry of the injected carbon dioxide onto the 
surface or subsurface of the land of another person.76 Wrongful entry into the subsoil of land 
in the possession of another is trespass including where entry is affected through a natural 
aperture on the defendant’s own land;77 by excavation78 or tunnelling.79 Given that it may be 
some time before the owner becomes aware of the presence of the migrated substance, time 
limitations on the commencement of an action are likely to be relevant. Where the substance 
remains left on/under the land then this will be a continuing trespass and there will be a 
separate cause of action for each day the interference continues.80 In other cases, there will be 
a time limit of six years from the date the cause of action accrues regardless of whether the 
plaintiff has become aware of the damage suffered within that period.81  
To succeed in an action for trespass, the plaintiff must have actual possession of the relevant 
land82 (“requisite title to sue”) and there must be a direct and actionable interference with 
land for which the defendant must be at fault.83 Accordingly, landholders affected directly by 
the leakage of carbon dioxide could bring an action in trespass.84 A mere licensee would not 
hold the requisite title to sue85 although a holder of an easement or profit a prendre may do 
 
74 GGSA Qld, s 338A. 
75 GGGSA Vic, s 187. 
76 Edwards v Sims (1929) Ky 24 SW (2d) 619; Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550 at 561-2 per Stephen J. 
77 See McGlone F and Stickley A, Australian Torts Law (LexisNexis Butterworths, 2nd ed, 2009) p 66 citing 
Edwards v Sims (1929) Ky 24 SW (2d) 619.  
78 Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550 at 561-562 per Stephen J; Di Napoli v New Beach Apartments Pty Ltd 
(2004) 11 BPR 21,493 per Young CJ in Eq, SC(NSW); Burton v Spragg [2007] WASC 247. 
79 Bulli Coal Mining Co v Osborne [1899] AC 351.  
80 Konskier v B Goodman Ltd [1928] 1 KB 421; Watson v Cowen [1959] Tas SR 194.  
81Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 10(1)(a); Limitations of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), s 5(1)(a); Limitation 
Act 2005 (WA), s 13(1); McLaren and Fahey, n 46 at 64. 
82 Newington v Windeyer (1985) 3 NSWLR 555 at 563-564. 
83 Stoneman v Lyons (1975) 133 CLR 550; Scott v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm Bl 892; McGlone and Stickley, n 77, 
p 55.  
84 Where there is a continuing trespass, a subsequent transferee of the land may sue: Hudson v Nicholson (1839) 
5 M&W 437. 
85 Hill v Tupper (1863) 2 H & C 121. 
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so.86 This could include the holder of an affected minerals or petroleum tenement where it is 
characterised as a profit a prendre or easement.87 The plaintiff must be able to show that the 
defendant acted intentionally or with a lack of care (“fault”).88 It must also be demonstrated 
that the defendant’s act(s) set in train an unbroken series of consequences which resulted in 
the interference complained of (“direct interference”).89 Where the harm caused was a 
consequential or indirect result of the act of the defendant, then a claim in nuisance or 
negligence would be more appropriate.90  
In Australia, the plaintiff does not need to prove that they have suffered any loss or damage to 
succeed in their trespass action although this will affect the assessment of damages.91 In the 
US case of Cassinos v Union Oil Co of California,92 where waste fluids injected underground 
led to subsurface migration into a mineral estate, the damages awarded included the market 
rental value of the property for the duration of the trespass.93 The remedies of the Court could 
also have included the deterioration in value of the mineral deposits and the costs of 
removal/remediation of the affected property.94 However, case law in the US has suggested 
that damages would not be recoverable where the carbon dioxide migrates into a saline 
reservoir that does not have any foreseeable use by the landholder, for example where the 
reservoir is devoid of any extractable minerals of value.95 The US case of Chance v BP 
Chemicals96 has also demonstrated the substantial difficulties that will be faced by a 
landholder in attempting to establish factually that the migration of subterranean gases has 
occurred and has entered the substrata of the land.97 In that case, the US court identified a 
 
86 Fitzgerald v Firbank [1897] 2 Ch 96; Moreland Timber Co v Reid [1946] VLR 237. 
87 Commentators have argued that, in certain circumstances, a minerals or petroleum tenement constitutes a 
profit a prendre: for example Ryan GLJ, ‘Petroleum Royalties’ (1985) AMPLA Yearbook 328 at 349. 
88 Nickells v Mayor, Aldermen, Councillors and Citizens of the City of Melbourne (1938) 59 CLR 219 at 225 per 
Dixon J; Public Transport Commission (NSW) v Perry (1977) 137 CLR 107 at 132 per Gibbs J.  
89 Hillier v Leitch [1936] SASR 490 at 494 per Cleland J; Platt v Nutt (1988) 12 NSWLR 231 at 245 per Clarke 
JA. 
90 Southport Corporation v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1954] 2 QB 183. 
91 Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 St Tn 1029; Halliday v Nevill (1984) 155 CLR 1 at 10; McGlone and Stickley, 
n 77, p 26.  
92 Cassinos v Union Oil Co of California 14 Cal App 4th 1770 (1993). 
93 Cassinos v Union Oil Co of California 14 Cal App 4th 1770 (1993), 1778, 1784. 
94 Cassinos v Union Oil Co of California 14 Cal App 4th 1770 (1993), 1784-1786. In Australia, see Palmer 
Bruyn & Parker Pty Ltd v Parsons (2001) 208 CLR 388; Evans v Balog [1976] 1 NSWLR 36. An injunction 
may also be awarded for a continuing trespass: Bendal Pty Ltd v Mirvac Project Pty Ltd (1991) 23 NSWLR 464; 
McGlone and Stickley, n 77, p 74.  
95 LoBaugh, n 37, p 76; Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio St 3d 17 (1996), 25. 
96 Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio St 2d 17 (1996). 
97 Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio St 3d 17 (1996), 26; see also Bidlack C, ‘Regulating the Inevitable: 
Understanding the Legal Consequences of and Providing for the Regulation of the Geologic Sequestration of 
Carbon Dioxide’ (2010) 30 Journal of Land, Resources and Environmental Law 199 at 211, 216. 
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number of undefined variables associated with the migration of the waste water injected by 
BP including the permeability, porosity and thickness of the substrata and difficulty in 
identifying the location and concentrations of the waste water within the substrate at any 
point in time.98 Similar obstacles are likely to be faced by affected landholders within 
Australia. 
Unreasonable interference and actions in public/private nuisance 
An action may also be brought in private nuisance for the “unreasonable interference with a 
person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over, or in connection with it”.99 A 
successful cause of action must establish that: the plaintiff has title to sue;100 the defendant 
has interfered with a legally recognised right;101 and there is proof of physical damage to the 
land or any building works or vegetation on it, or intangible damage that amounts to a 
substantial and unreasonable interference with the enjoyment of the land.102 In order to sue, 
the plaintiff must be the owner (or a person with exclusive possession) of a private interest in 
the relevant land or affected watercourse.103  
Actions may also be bought by the Attorney-General in public nuisance for interference 
caused to the public at large, for example, impacts on public land and waterways and 
pollution of public waters.104 Carbon dioxide leakage may also result in the committal of the 
crime of public nuisance.105An individual may also bring an action in public nuisance with 
the consent of the Attorney-General provided that the individual can show that he or she has 
suffered special damage over and above that suffered by the public at large.106 This is not an 
easy threshold. For example, commercial fishermen were denied the right to sue for pollution 
 
98 Chance v BP Chemicals Inc 77 Ohio St 3d 17 (1996), 24-27. 
99 Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40 at 49 per Windeyer J. 
100 Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654. 
101 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880 at 896-903 per Lord Atkin; Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 
110 CLR 40 at 59 per Windeyer J. 
102 St Helen’s Smelting Co v Tipping (1865) 11 HL Cas 642 at 650-651; Munro v Southern Dairies Ltd [1955] 
VLR 332. 
103Malone v Laskey [1907] 2 KB 141; Oldham v Lawson (No 1) [1976] VR 654. 
104 Esso Petroleum Co v Southport Corporation [1956] AC 218; Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & 
Engineering Co (The Wagon Mound) [1961] AC 388; R v The “Sun Diamond” [1984] 1 FC 3; A B v South West 
Water Services Ltd [1993] QB 507. 
105 See, for example, Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld), Sch 1, s 230 ‘Common Nuisance’. Offences of unlawful 
environmental nuisance may also apply. 
106 Walsh v Ervin [1952] VLR 361 at 371 per Scholl J. 
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of waters as their fishing rights were taken to be no different from those of the general 
public.107  
The types of harm that could give rise to a successful claim in private nuisance will include 
flooding of land, explosions/fire, damage to subsurface rights and intangible damage such as 
noxious fumes, gas, smoke, dust, vibration and noise.108 The interference must be sufficiently 
substantial to cause material injury to the land or property or substantial interference with the 
comfort and convenience of the occupier of the land.109 Both the person who causes the 
nuisance and anyone who authorises the action or inaction resulting in the nuisance can be 
liable.110 This is particularly relevant when we consider that the injected carbon dioxide may 
migrate across a number of parcels of land outside of the approved storage site including 
across Crown land and private land. In those circumstances, an element of reasonable 
foreseeability will operate to determine whether the occupier of the land knew, or ought to 
have known, of the occurrence of the nuisance and whether it was reasonable in the 
circumstances to have expected them to take steps to rectify the nuisance.111  
In defending a cause of action in trespass or nuisance, defendants may be able to rely on 
statutory authorisation for the activities giving rise to the interference. To be successful, the 
defendant must demonstrate that the relevant statute was expressly intended to authorise 
activities which, at common law, would constitute a nuisance; and that the specific harm 
caused was an inevitable consequence of the exercise of that statutory authorisation.112 Given 
that these CCS projects will be authorised to operate only within defined boundaries, it seems 
unlikely that the defence of statutory authorisation would be available for leakages outside 
the storage site.  
 
107 Ball v Consolidated Rutile [1991] 1 Qd R 524 where the pecuniary loss was held to not be sufficient for 
standing. 
108 Sedleigh-Denfield v O’Callaghan [1940] AC 880; Hargrave v Goldman (1963) 110 CLR 40; Sturges v 
Bridgman (1879) 11 Ch D 852; Vincent v Peacock [1973] 1 NSWLR 466; Bamford v Turnley (1862) 3 B&S 62; 
Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683. 
109 Munro v Southern Dairies [1955] VLR 332; see also Qantas Airways Ltd v Mascot Galvanising (Holdings) 
Pty Ltd (Unreported, Supreme Court, NSW, Windeyer J, 17 December 1998) at 43-44 (subsurface migration of 
pollution). 
110 Fennell v Robson Excavations Pty Ltd [1977] 2 NSWLR 486. 
111 Montana Hotels v Fasson (1986) 69 ALR 258; Leakey v National Trust [1980] QB 485 at 526; Delaware 
Mansions Ltd v Westminster City Council [2001] UKHL 55. 
112 Kempsey Shire Council v Lawrence (1996) Aust Torts Reports 81-375; Bonnici v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal 
Council [2001] NSWSC 1124; Bankstown City Council v Alamdo Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 223 CLR 660. 
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Potential remedies for unlawful nuisance include abatement, injunctive relief and 
compensatory damages.113 The award of an injunction is discretionary and will depend upon 
a number of factors including the nature of the nuisance (and whether it is continuing and not 
fleeting or trivial) and the public interest – including considerations of the public benefit from 
permitting, or halting, the CCS project.114 Where the nuisance has caused reasonably 
foreseeable damage to property, compensation may include the diminution in value of the 
property and the cost of remediation.115 The Court may also consider awarding exemplary 
damages where the nuisance was intentional or wilful.116 
 
Breach of a duty of care and potential actions in negligence  
The following elements must be satisfied in order for an injured party to successfully claim in 
negligence for losses suffered as a result of a CCS project: 
 The existence of a duty of care owed by the CCS operator to the plaintiff; 
 A breach by the CCS operator of that standard of care; and 
 The presence of a causative link between the harm suffered by the plaintiff and the 
CCS operator’s act or omission.117 
The harm caused by these CCS projects could include personal injury and pure economic 
loss. Whether a duty of care is owed by the CCS operator to the affected landholder, for 
example, will depend on whether the harm caused is recognised as having been a reasonably 
foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligent conduct.118 In these novel circumstances, it 
will also depend upon the Court’s examination of the “salient factors” of the case to 
determine whether a duty of care is justified.119 These will include:120 
 
113 Moss v Christchurch Rural District Council [1925] 2 KB 750. 
114 Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966. 
115 Murphy v Brown (1985) 1 NSWLR 131 ; Davidson v JS Gilbert Fabrications Pty Ltd [1986] 1 Qd R 1; 
Hyder Consulting (Australia) Pty Ltd v Wilh Wilhelsmen Agency Pty Ltd (2001) 18 BCL 122. 
116 Willoughby Municipal Council v Halstead (1916) 22 CLR 352. 
117 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 9-11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), ss 48, 49; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 
5B, 5C. 
118 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 at 580 per Lord Atkin. 
119 McGlone and Stickley, n 77, 148.  
120 McGlone and Stickley, n 77, 148-149.  
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 The type of harm suffered and whether it constitutes a breach of a legally recognised 
right such as property rights or rights of personal security;121 
 The context and proximity of the relationship between the plaintiff and the CCS 
operator and whether it should give rise to a duty of care;122 
 The circumstances surrounding the alleged duty, with particular attention given to the 
CCS operator’s control over the harm suffered by the plaintiff;123 
 The plaintiff’s vulnerability to risk, including the ability of the plaintiff to protect 
itself from the harm suffered;124 
 Whether the finding of a duty of care would create incoherency in the law having 
regard to pre-existing legal obligations and duties such as those created by contract or 
legislation;125 
 Public policy considerations regarding the imposition of a duty of care, such as 
floodgates concerns, and whether liability for the loss should properly be imposed 
upon the CCS operator;126 and  
 Any relevant case law from other jurisdictions or law reform commentary.127  
In setting the objective standard of care, the Court will take into account a number of factors 
including the relationship between the parties, the magnitude of the risk of leakage from the 
CCS project to the local environment and atmosphere, the probability of that risk actually 
occurring and the relative expense and difficulty of demanding that a reasonable person take 
steps to alleviate that risk at that point in time.128 A CCS operator will not have breached a 
duty to take precautions against a risk of harm unless: the risk was foreseeable (that is, it is a 
risk of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); the risk was not 
 
121 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 205 
ALR 522; Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52.  
122 Tame v New South Wales; Annetts v Australian Stations (2002) 211 CLR 317; Bryan v Maloney (1995) 182 
CLR 609; Graham Barclay Oysters v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
123 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 205 ALR 522; Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry 
Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180. 
124 Woolcock Street Investments Pty Ltd v CDG Pty Ltd (2004) 216 CLR 515 at [23] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, 
Hayne and Heydon JJ; Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; Gifford v Strang Patrick Stevedoring (2003) 198 
ALR 100; Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52.  
125 Sullivan v Moody (2001) 207 CLR 562; Koehler v Cerebos (Australia) Ltd (2005) 222 CLR 44; Graham 
Barclay Oysters v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
126 Perre v Apand (1999) 198 CLR 180; Caltex Oil (Australia) Pty Ltd v The Dredge ‘Willemstad’ (1976) 136 
CLR 529; Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 
CLR 22. See also Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 51(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA), s 5C(2). 
127 Harriton v Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52; Leichhardt Municipal Council v Montgomery (2007) 230 CLR 22; 
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512.  
128 Mulligan v Coffs Harbour City Council (2006) 80 ALJR 43 at [5] per Hayne J. 
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insignificant; and in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person 
would have taken the precautions.129 The foreseeability of the risk is assessed at the time the 
act or omission occurred.130 A risk may be considered to have been foreseeable even though 
it was unlikely to occur, provided it was not far-fetched or fanciful.131 Moreover, the risk 
does not have to be substantial to be “not insignificant”.132  
It will be a challenging task for the Court to establish the reasonable standard of care for 
these novel CCS projects including the standard of care for selecting a suitable storage site 
and acceptable methods for injecting the carbon dioxide into the site and undertaking 
appropriate monitoring and verification of the site for hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years 
to protect against possible leakages from the site.133  
In considering the precautions that a “reasonable person” should have taken against the risk 
of harm from these CCS projects, the Court will examine the: 
 Probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken; 
 Likely seriousness of the harm – including the magnitude and gravity of the harm; 
 Burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm – it should be noted that the 
expense and difficulty of those precautions will be considered in the context of the 
gravity of the risk of harm with reference to the “reasonable person with adequate 
resources for the activity in which it was engaged”;134 and 
 Social utility of the activity that created the risk of harm – this would be likely to 
include the public benefit from the sequestration of greenhouse gases through CCS 
activities.135 
Given that early CCS projects do not yet have a consistent approach to the management of 
CCS, it should be noted that the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing 
something in a different way will not of itself give rise to or affect liability for the way in 
 
129 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B(1). 
130 Rosenberg v Percival (2001) 205 CLR 434 at [16]. 
131 Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40 at 48; Sappideen C and Vines P, Fleming’s The Law of 
Torts (Thomson Reuters, 10th ed, 2011) p 162. 
132 Ipp D, Cane P, Sheldon D and Macintosh I, Review of the Law of Negligence Report (2 October 2002) at 
[7.15] http://www.revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/review2.asp viewed 20 January 2012. 
133 Klass and Wilson, n 13 at 137. 
134 PQ v Australian Red Cross Society [1992] 1 VR 19 at 33-34 per McGarvie J; Caledonian Collieries Ltd v 
Speirs (1957) 97 CLR 202; Romeo v Conservation Commission (NT) (1998) 192 CLR 431; Wyong Shire 
Council v Shirt (1980) 146 CLR 40. 
135 LoBaugh, n 37, p 75; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA), s 5B(2)(d). 
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which the thing was done.136 Standards, including binding regulatory standards, expert 
opinion and common industry practice, are of increasing relevance to the Court in 
determining whether a standard of care has been breached.137 Compliance with the relevant 
standard for CCS will be taken into account by the Court although it will not be 
conclusive.138 Indeed, common industry practice in the carrying out of the CCS activities may 
itself be found to have been negligent.139  
In deciding whether a breach of duty caused the particular damage, the Court will consider: 
 Whether the breach of duty was a necessary condition of the occurrence of the harm 
(“factual causation”); and 
 Whether it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of the CCS operator to extend to 
the harm (“scope of liability”) – this will include consideration of the salient factors 
considered for novel cases including consideration of whether or not, and why, 
responsibility for the harm should be imposed on the party in breach.140  
In addressing causation, the Courts have traditionally applied the common sense and 
experience test encompassing the “but for” test; that is, whether the plaintiff’s damage would 
have occurred “but for” the defendant’s act or omissions.141 However, this test now operates 
in conjunction with additional considerations regarding the appropriate scope of liability. The 
plaintiff must demonstrate that, on the balance of probabilities, the CCS operator’s acts or 
omissions caused the risk that resulted in the damage suffered.142 There must be a “more 
probable inference in favour of what is alleged”, not just a possibility.143 An action will fail if 
other causes of the harm are equally probable on the facts.144 Therefore, the plaintiff would 
need to show that carbon dioxide leakage from the storage site is capable of causing the harm 
 
136 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 10; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 49. 
137 Sappideen and Vines, n 131, pp 149-150. 
138 Sibley v Kais (1967) 118 CLR 424 at 427; Tucker v McCann [1948] VLR 222. 
139 Mercer v Commissioner for Road Transport and Tramways (NSW) (1936) 56 CLR 580 at 589. 
140 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 11; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 51(2); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C(2); 
Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 639; Graham v Hall [2006] NSWCA 208; Cattanach v Melchior (2003) 215 
CLR 1. 
141 March v E & MH Stramare Pty Ltd (1991) 171 CLR 506 at 516 per Mason CJ; Roads and Traffic Authority v 
Royal (2008) 82 ALJR 870; [2008] HCA 19 at [81] per Kirby J. 
142 Barnett v Chelsea and Kensington Hospital Management Committee [1969] 1 QB 428. 
143 TNT Management Pty Ltd v Brooks (1979) 23 ALR 345 at 349 per Gibbs J; Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness 
(2000) 49 NSWLR 262 per Spigelman J at 75; St George Club Ltd v Hines (1961) 35 ALJR 106 at 107. 
144 Chisholm v State Transport Authority (1987) 46 SASR 148; Tubemakers of Australia Ltd v Fernandez (1976) 
50 ALJR 720 at 724 per Mason J. 
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suffered by the plaintiff and that leakage from the specific site caused the specific harm.145 It 
may be difficult to prove that the leakage from the site was caused by the defendant. For 
example, where there are fractures in the geological formation, or joining of geological 
formations, it may be very difficult to establish that this was the fault of the particular CCS 
operator and not caused by other factors including natural events or other natural resource 
operators in the area.146 Furthermore, if there have been multiple operators within the pore 
space or carbon dioxide has migrated over substantial distances, then identifying the 
appropriate defendant could “prove exceedingly difficult”.147  
In such circumstances, the Court will have to consider whether other causes have intervened 
to break the chain of causation, so that other CCS operators or managers of the site were “the 
last wrongdoers”.148 A break in the chain of causation is not necessarily determinative and 
will be but one factor in the considerations of the Court.149 
 
Ministerial powers to intervene in the conduct of CCS operations 
The causation issue becomes all the more problematic when we consider the complexity of 
the regulatory interactions between the CCS operator and the regulatory authorities that will 
occur in the conduct of these CCS activities. Australian CCS legislation provides a CCS 
operator holding a lease or licence with rights to inject and store carbon dioxide.150 However, 
these rights are subject to the CCS operator complying with a broad range of directions from 
the CCS regulatory authority relating to the permissible composition and origins of the 
injected carbon dioxide and the volume and rate of injection. In all jurisdictions, the CCS 
operator must comply with an approved plan151 setting out the rate of carbon dioxide 
 
145 De Figueiredo M, The Liability of Carbon Dioxide Storage (PhD Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2007), 
http://sequestration.mit.edu/pdf/Mark_de_Figueiredo_PhD_Dissertation.pdf viewed 20 January 2012. 
146 See Klass and Wilson, n 13 at 137 for commentary on the difficulties in establishing causation.  
147 Krupa, n 47, p 59; Klass and Wilson, n 13 at 137. 
148 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Company Ltd [1970] AC 1004.  
149 Harvey v PD (2004) 59 NSWLR 639 at [188]. 
150 OPGGSA Cth, s 357; GGSA Qld, s 110; GGGSA Vic, s 71; OPGGSA Vic, s 372(1); PGERA WA, proposed 
s 62(3); PGELA Bill WA, cl 62(3).  
151 Known as a site plan (GGSA Qld, s 141(c)(i)); injection and monitoring plan (GGGSA Vic, s 93; PGERA 
WA, proposed s 66(3)(a); PGELA Bill WA, cl 66(3)(a)) and conditions of an injection licence: OPGGSA Cth, 
ss 358(3)(d), (e), (f), (j); OPGGSA Vic, s 374(1). 
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injection,152 the composition of the greenhouse gas stream that is permitted to be injected,153 
and for Commonwealth and offshore Victorian projects, the permitted origin/s of the carbon 
dioxide.154 Any amendments to the plan will require the consent of the relevant Minister155 
and approval is discretionary.156 In Queensland, if the proposed amendment involves a 
reduction in the rate of carbon dioxide injection the Minister will first consider whether the 
reduction is reasonable; and whether the CCS operator has taken all reasonable steps to 
prevent the reduction.157 In Victoria, onshore licence holders may be required to vary the 
injection and monitoring plan.158 The Victorian or Western Australian Minister may also 
direct the holder of the licence to change the volume of, or the rate at which, the carbon 
dioxide is injected if they consider that the direction is necessary to enable more effective 
substance injection or to maximise the volume of the substance able to be stored.159 
Broad Ministerial powers to issue directions also exist where a “serious situation” emerges in 
relation to the CCS project. “Serious situation” is broadly defined and will include where 
carbon dioxide injected into the storage formation has leaked or will leak in the course of 
being injected.160 In Queensland, and under the Commonwealth and offshore Victorian 
legislation, it also includes where there is a significant risk that the carbon dioxide will leak 
from the formation.161 For the Commonwealth and offshore Victorian legislation, this 
includes the injected carbon dioxide migrating outside the expected migration path.162 
 
152 OPGGSA Cth, s 358(3)(j); GGSA Qld, s 142(2)(c); GGGSA Vic, s 94(e); OPGGSA Vic, s 374(1)(j). In WA, 
the matters that must be contained in an injection and monitoring plan will be addressed in future regulations: 
PGERA WA, proposed s 63A(1); PGELA Bill WA, cl 63A(1). 
153 OPGGSA Cth, s 358(3)(d); GGSA Qld, s 142(2)(d); GGGSA Vic, s 94(c); OPGGSA Vic, s 374(1)(d). 
154 OPGGSA Cth, s 358(3)(f); OPGGSA Vic, s 374(1)(f). In WA, the application for the injection licence must 
specify the source and volume of the substance to be injected: PGERA WA, proposed s 52(1)(da); PGELA Bill 
WA, cl 52(1)(da).  
155 GGSA Qld, s 157; OPGGSA Cth, s 374(1); GGGSA Vic, s 110; OPGGSA Vic, s 399; PGERA WA, 
proposed s 63B; PGELA Bill WA, cl 63B.  
156 GGSA Qld, ss 157-159; GGGSA Vic, s 110; OPGGSA Cth, s 374(3); OPGGSA Vic, s 399(3); PGERA WA, 
proposed s 63B(3); PGELA Bill WA, cl 63B(3).  
157 GGSA Qld, s 158(c). 
158 GGGSA Vic, ss 107, 109. 
159 GGGSA Vic, ss 89-91; PGERA WA, proposed s 63B(1); PGELA Bill WA, cl 63B(1).  
160OPGGSA Cth, s 379(1); GGSA Qld, s 363(1); GGGSA Vic, s 6; OPGGSA Vic, s 405(1). Unlike the other 
jurisdictions, the PGERA WA/PGELA Bill WA does not propose to include directions for responding to 
“serious situations”.  
161 OPGGSA Cth, s 379(1)(b); GGSA Qld, s 363(1)(b); OPGGSA Vic, s 405(1)(b). 
162 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth) p 51; 
Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (Vic) p 102.  
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Accordingly, there does not need to be a risk of “harm”, per se, in order for a “serious 
situation” to be triggered.163 
A serious situation can also occur where the carbon dioxide being injected has behaved or is 
behaving otherwise than as predicted.164 The Commonwealth and offshore Victorian 
provisions include where there is a significant risk that the carbon dioxide will behave 
otherwise than as predicted.165 Where the injection or storage of carbon dioxide has had, or 
will have, a significant adverse impact166 on the geotechnical integrity of the storage 
formation, this will also constitute a “serious situation” in the Victorian jurisdictions and 
offshore Commonwealth areas.167  
Once a serious situation has been established, the Minister has the authority to issue a range 
of directions to the CCS operator at their own discretion. Those directions can require the 
CCS operator to take “any” action and can prohibit the operator from taking certain 
actions.168 This could include directions to cease or suspend the injection of carbon dioxide 
into the storage site.169 The CCS operator may also be directed to take specific steps to 
remedy the “serious situation”,170 or be directed to carry out the injection of the carbon 
dioxide in a particular manner.171 It will be an offence for the CCS operator not to comply 
with those Ministerial directions.172  
Under the Commonwealth and Victorian offshore legislation, there are a number of 
additional directions that may be made including directions to eliminate, mitigate or manage 
the risk that operations may have a significant adverse impact on a geological formation that 
contains (or is likely to contain) a petroleum pool;173 orders to protect petroleum 
discoveries174 and directions about “any matter” in relation to which regulations may be 
 
163 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth) p 51; 
Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (Vic) p 102.  
164 GGSA Qld, s 363(1)(c); GGGSA Vic, s 6(c); OPGGSA Cth, s 379(1)(e); OPGGSA Vic, s 405(1)(e). 
165 OPGGSA Cth, s 379(1)(f); OPGGSA Vic, s 405(1)(f). 
166 “Significant adverse impact” is determined in accordance with the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas 
Storage (Greenhouse Gas Injection and Storage) Regulations 2011 (Cth) for the purposes of resolving conflict 
with petroleum operations.  
167 GGGSA Vic, s 6(d); OPGGSA Cth, s 379(1)(g); OPGGSA Vic, s 405(1)(g). Under the Commonwealth and 
Victorian offshore legislation there only needs to be a significant risk this will occur: ss 379(1)(h) and 405(1)(h) 
respectively. 
168 OPGGSA Cth, ss 380(1)(g), (h); GGGSA Vic, ss 182(f), (g); OPGGSA Vic, ss 406(1)(g), (h). 
169 OPGGSA Cth, s 380(1)(c); GGSA Qld, s 364(2); GGGSA Vic, s 182(c); OPGGSA Vic, s 406(1)(c). 
170 GGSA Qld, s 364(2); GGGSA Vic, s 182(e); OPGGSA Cth, s 380(1)(f); OPGGSA Vic, s 406(1)(f). 
171 OPGGSA Cth, s 380(1)(a); GGGSA Vic, ss 182(a),(b); OPGGSA Vic, s 406(1)(a). 
172 OPGGSA Cth, s 382; GGGSA Vic, s 183; GGSA Qld, s 366; OPGGSA Vic, s 409. 
173 OPGGSA Cth, s 376(1); OPGGSA Vic, s 401(1). 
174 OPGGSA Cth, s 383(1); OPGGSA Vic, s 410(1). 
 23 
 
made.175 The relevant Minister may also take non-compliance action against the operator 
including amending the lease or licence by reducing its term or area or imposing a new 
condition,176 monetary penalties177 or cancellation of the lease or licence.178 The Victorian 
Minister may also cancel an onshore licence where it is in the “public interest”, or if the 
activity has caused a risk to public health or the environment.179  
Additional notices or directions may also be issued by other regulatory authorities including 
those responsible for the protection of the environment. State environmental protection 
legislation allows for the issue of directions, or orders, where environmental harm, pollution 
or a similar situation arises.180 Notices may require the recipient to cease or modify the 
activity in question,181 conduct monitoring,182 take measures to prevent, control or abate the 
situation,183 take specified management action,184 or rehabilitate the environment.185 Similar 
directions may also be issued where a condition of an environmental approval has been 
contravened.186 Under Commonwealth CCS legislation, the Minister may issue 
determinations requiring repair or mitigation of environmental damage,187 backed by civil 
penalties for breach.188 Where a person is convicted of an offence, such as unlawful 
environmental harm,189 the Court is also generally empowered to make orders requiring 
rehabilitation or restoration of the environment.190  
Consequently, there is a high risk of ministerial intervention in the carrying out of these CCS 
projects. The CCS legislation does provide some protection to CCS operators where they are 
complying with a “serious situation” direction issued by the regulator. In Queensland, when 
responding to a serious situation direction, any civil liability attaching to the operator for an 
 
175 OPGGSA Cth, s 580(2); OPGGSA Vic, s 629(2). 
176 GGSA Qld, s 379(1). 
177 GGSA Qld, s 379(1). 
178 GGSA Qld, s 379(1); GGGSA Vic, s 175; OPGGSA Cth, s 447; OPGGSA Vic, s 482; PGERA WA, 
proposed s 99; PGELA Bill WA, cl 99.  
179 GGGSA Vic, s 175. 
180 Environmental Protection Act 1970 (Vic) (EPA Vic), ss 31A, 31B, 62A; Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld) (EPA Qld), ss 363H, 358; Environmental Protection Act 1986 (WA) (EPA WA), ss 65, 68A, 73A. 
181 EPA Vic, ss 31A(2)(a), (b); EPA Qld, s 360(2). 
182 EPA Vic, s 31A(2)(f); EPA WA, ss 65(1a)(e), 68A(7)(a). 
183 EPA WA, ss 65(1a)(c), 73A(2); EPA Qld, s 363H(1)(a). 
184 EPA WA, s 68A(7)(c). 
185 EPA Qld, s 363H(1)(b). 
186 EPA Vic, s 31A(1)(b)(iv); EPA Qld, s 358(d)(iii). 
187 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act), ss 480D, 480L, 480M. 
188 For example, EPBC Act, ss 481 and 485, where breach of an approval condition results in a significant 
impact on a matter of national environmental significance, and the person is reckless as to the contravention of 
the condition: EPBC Act, s 142A.  
189 EPA Qld, ss 437, 438; EPA WA, ss 50A, 50B. 
190 EPA WA, s 99X(1); EPA Qld, s 502(2)(a); EPBC Act, s 480A. 
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act done or omission made under the CCS legislation will instead attach to the State – 
provided that the act or omission was done honestly and without negligence.191 Under the 
Commonwealth and Victorian offshore legislation, a person acting under the specific 
direction or authority of the Minister or relevant authority will be protected from any action, 
suit or proceeding relating to an act or omission in good faith “in the exercise, or purported 
exercise, of any power or authority conferred by” the Act, regulations, or a direction under 
the Act.192 This protection specifically excludes any acts or omissions in the carrying out of 
an approved proposal or plan under the CCS legislation.193 In those circumstances, the 
Government has stated that the CCS operator will remain legally responsible for any 
deficiencies in the plan, despite receiving approval in good faith under the legislation.194 
 
PRE-CONDITIONS FOR SITE CLOSURE AND TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY TO THE STATE 
There are a number of pre-conditions that must be satisfied prior to closure of the CCS site 
and handover of responsibility for CCS operations to the State. Under the Commonwealth, 
Western Australian and offshore Victorian CCS legislation, the applicant must apply for a 
site-closing certificate within 30 days of cessation of injection.195 The Minister must make a 
decision whether or not to grant a pre-certificate notice within five years.196 The Minister 
may refuse to give the pre-certificate notice if:  
 Not satisfied that the substance is behaving as predicted in the approved site plan; or 
 There is a significant risk that a substance will have a significant adverse impact on 
the conservation or exploitation of natural resources; the geotechnical integrity of the 
formation or structure; the environment; or human health or safety.197 
 
191 GGSA Qld, s 425. 
192 OPGGSA Cth, s 768; OPGGSA Vic, s 787. 
193 OPGGSA Cth, s 768(2); OPGGSA Vic, s 787(2). 
194 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Bill 2005 (Cth) p 204; Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore 
Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (Vic) p 166. 
195 OPGGSA Cth, s 386(4); OPGGSA Vic, s 415; PGERA WA, proposed ss 69JA(2), (3); PGELA Bill WA, cll 
69JA(2), (3).  
196 OPGGSA Cth, s 388(8); OPGGSA Vic, s 420(2); PGELA Bill WA proposed, s 69JD(8); PGELA Bill WA, 
cl 69JD(8). 
197 OPGGSA Cth, s 388(4); OPGGSA Vic, s 422; PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JD(4); PGELA Bill WA, cl 
69JD(4). The proposed WA bill is somewhat different and directs the Minister’s attention to whether there is a 
significant risk that a greenhouse gas substance will have a significant adverse impact on the conservation of 
resources of the soil or the Earth’s crust instead of ‘the conservation or exploitation of natural resources’: s 
69JD(4)(b). 
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Once issued, the pre-certificate notice must specify a program of operations for monitoring 
and verification of the carbon dioxide substance and the required level of security to cover 
the costs of that program.198 This security is considered necessary given that the monitoring 
program will be carried out over a considerable period of time and “there is no certainty that 
the person responsible for payment of the [State]’s costs and expenses will still be in 
existence, or still in a financial position to reimburse the [State]”.199 Once the security is 
lodged, the Minister must issue the site-closing certificate, which will remain in force 
indefinitely.200  
Under the Commonwealth, Western Australian and offshore Victorian frameworks, the 
Minister may also issue site-closing directions directing the CCS operator to carry out 
monitoring and precautionary or remedial work201 “for the purpose of ensuring that the 
injected carbon dioxide does not, in the future, cause damage to the environment or other 
resources or cause injury or loss to others”.202 These directions are intended to increase the 
likelihood that the stored substance will behave as predicted in the approved site plan.203  
For Western Australia and offshore Commonwealth areas,204 the closure assurance period for 
the CCS site will be declared to be completed when: 
 A site closing certificate has been issued;205  
 It is at least 15 years after the site closing certificate was issued;206  
 The Minister is satisfied that the carbon dioxide is behaving as predicted in the 
approved site plan for the formation;207 and 
 
198 OPGGSA Cth, s 391; OPGGSA Vic, s 426; PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JG; PGELA Bill WA, cl 69JG. 
199 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth) p 56; 
Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (Vic) p 106.  
200 OPGGSA Cth, ss 392, 394; OPGGSA Vic, ss 427, 429; PGELA Bill WA, proposed ss 69JH, 69JJ; PGELA 
Bill WA, cll 69JH, 69JJ. 
201 OPGGSA Cth, s 593; OPGGSA Vic, s 641; PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 101; PGELA Bill WA, cl 101. 
Note the WA bill does not propose to allow for the issue of site closing directions requiring monitoring.  
202 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth) p 89 
(see Attachment A, p 24 for commentary on the purpose of imposing monitoring requirements); Explanatory 
Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Bill 2010 (Vic) p 106.  
203 OPGGSA Cth, s 593(2)(g); OPGGSA Vic, s 641(2)(g). 
204 A closure assurance period has not been included in the Victorian offshore scheme. 
205 OPGGSA Cth, s 399(1)(a); PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JO(1)(a); PGELA Bill WA, cl 69JO(1)(a), Pt 3, 
Div 4C [Act]/Ch 2, Pt 3, Div 4C [Bill].  
206 OPGGSA Cth, s 399(1)(c); PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JO(1)(c); PGELA Bill WA, cl 69JO(1)(c). 
207 OPGGSA Cth, s 399(1)(c)(i); PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JO(1)(c)(i); PGELA Bill WA, cl 69JO(1)(c)(i). 
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 There is no significant risk that the carbon dioxide will have a significant adverse 
impact on the geotechnical integrity of the geological formation/structure, 
environment or human health or safety.208 
However, a site closing certificate will not be issued until “a high degree of certainty had 
been attained” in respect of the behaviour of the carbon dioxide within the formation.209 This 
broad ministerial discretion will create a high degree of uncertainty for CCS operators who 
are unable to predict with any certainty when they will be permitted to surrender their licence 
and relinquish their responsibility for the site.210 Indeed, the “timing is indefinite”.211 If the 
CCS operator is unable or unwilling to carry out the ongoing monitoring program then the 
Commonwealth may step in and carry out the program itself. In this case, any reasonable 
costs or expenses incurred in carrying out the monitoring program are said to be recoverable 
as a debt due and payable.212 
In Queensland, the lease holder for the CCS project is required to lodge a surrender 
application.213 This application can only be made once injection ceases and all wells in the 
lease area have been decommissioned.214 The surrender application must be accompanied by 
a report stating the applicant’s: 
 Modelling of the behaviour of the carbon dioxide streams injected under the lease; 
 Assessment of the behaviour of injected streams; the expected migration pathway/s 
and the short-term and long-term consequences of the migration; and 
 Suggestions for the approach to be taken by the State if the surrender is approved, to 
monitor and verify the behaviour of the injected streams. 215 
Before deciding whether to approve the surrender of the lease the Minister may require the 
applicant to carry out stated work to reduce the risks.216 The Minister will approve a 
 
208 OPGGSA Cth, ss 399(1)(c)(ii)-(iv); PGELA Bill WA, proposed ss 69JO(1)(c)(ii)-(iv); PGELA Bill WA, cll 
69JO(1)(c)(ii)-(iv). 
209 Explanatory Memorandum, Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) Bill 2008 (Cth) 
Attachment A, p 24.  
210 Gibbs M, ‘Greenhouse Gas Storage in Offshore Waters: Balancing Competing Interests’ (2009) 28(1) 
Australian Resources and Energy Law Journal 52 at 70. 
211 Clarke C, “Long-term Liability for CCS: Some Thoughts About Specific Risks, Multiple Regimes and the 
EU Directive” in Havercroft I, Macrory R and Stewart R (eds), Carbon Capture and Storage: Emerging Legal 
and Regulatory Issues (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2011) p 195. 
212 OPGGSA Cth, s 398; OPGGSA Vic, s 433; PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 69JN; PGELA Bill WA, cl 69JN. 
213 GGSA Qld, s 174. 
214 GGSA Qld, s 176. 
215 GGSA Qld, s 177. 
216 GGSA Qld, s 178. 
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surrender only if (inter alia) the Minister considers the risks associated with stream storage 
under the lease have been reduced, in their opinion, as much as is reasonably practicable.217 
An application must also be made for the surrender of the relevant environmental authority 
for the CCS project.218 At that point, the environmental protection authority may require the 
CCS operator to pay a stated amount to address the residual risk associated with the ongoing 
management of the CCS project area including: 
 Continuation of a monitoring and verification plan to ensure stream storage is taking 
place as predicted; 
 Repairs to infrastructure for any wells in the relevant area; and 
 The operation of pumping equipment to manage stored substances within the relevant 
area.219 
In Victoria, the holder of an onshore authority may surrender it with the consent of the 
Minister.220 However, the Minister must not give consent to the surrender unless, inter alia, 
the Minister is of the opinion that: 
 The injected substance is behaving and will continue to behave in a predictable 
manner;221 
 The licence holder has reduced the risks associated with the permanent storage of the 
substance as low as is reasonably practicable;222 
 The stored substance will not present a risk to public health or the environment;223  
 And the licence holder has provided: 
 An assessment of the processes and pathways for potential migration and leakage to 
the environment;224 
 An assessment of the effects that any potential leakage might have on public health or 
the environment or any other resources in the licence area;225 
 A risk management plan in the event of leakage;226 and 
 
217 GGSA Qld, s 179. 
218 GGSA Qld, s 179; EPA Qld, s 311K. 
219 EPA Qld, s 311T. 
220 GGGSA Vic, s 168(1). 
221 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(a)(i). 
222 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(a)(ii). 
223 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(a)(iii). 
224 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(b)(v). 
225 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(b)(vi). 
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 A long-term monitoring and verification plan including an estimate of the cost of 
carrying out the activities in the plan.227 
The Minister must approve the licence holder’s long-term monitoring and verification plan 
before consenting to the surrender.228 As a condition of the onshore injection and monitoring 
licence, the licence holder must pay an annual instalment of the estimated long-term 
monitoring and verification costs set out in the approved injection and monitoring plan.229 
The licence holder is then required to pay any remaining costs prior to surrender.230 
From this point onward, the relevant public authority will be responsible for the CCS site 
including carrying out of the program of monitoring and verification on an indefinite basis.231 
Given the extremely long time periods involved, and the difficulties in accurately estimating 
the costs associated with the long-term monitoring and verification of these projects post-
closure, there is a risk that government agencies may not obtain sufficient funds or security 
from the CCS operator to carry out these monitoring and verification programs for the life of 
the storage project.232 It should also be noted that there is currently no statutory mechanism in 
place to enable public enforcement of these long-term maintenance and verification 
obligations against either the CCS operator or the State.233 
 
TREATMENT OF LONG-TERM LIABILITIES FOR CCS PROJECTS 
There are very different approaches to the treatment of the long-term liabilities of CCS 
projects across the jurisdictions following site closure. Under the Commonwealth CCS 
legislation, the Commonwealth will provide an indemnity for damages where there is a site 
closing certificate in force and there is a closure assurance period provided the liability: 
 
226 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(b)(vii). 
227 GGGSA Vic, s 170(1)(c). 
228 GGGSA Vic, s 170(2). 
229 GGGSA Vic, s 112. 
230 GGGSA Vic, s 174(1). 
231 OPGGSA Vic, s 500 specifically authorises the Minister to carry out operations in the offshore area for the 
purposes of monitoring of the stored substances.  
232 House Standing Committee on Primary Industries and Resources, Parliament of Australia, Down Under: 
Greenhouse Gas Storage – Inquiry into the Draft Offshore Petroleum Amendment (Greenhouse Gas Storage) 
Bill (2008) at 102.  
233 Global CCS Institute and WorleyParsons, Strategic Analysis of the Global Status of Carbon Capture and 
Storage, Report 3: Country Studies, Australia (2009) at 57, 
http://www.globalccsinstitute.com/publications/strategic-analysis-global-status-ccs-country-study-australia 
viewed 5 March 2012.  
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i.  is of an existing person who was/is the registered holder of the greenhouse gas 
injection licence  
– the indemnity will not apply where the person is no longer in existence or 
where the person liable is/was not the registered holder of the licence. 
ii.  is incurred or accrued after the end of the closure assurance period  
– the indemnity will not apply to any liabilities incurred or accrued before the 
declared completion of the closure assurance period by the Minister. 
iii.  is attributable to an act done or omitted to be done in the carrying out of operations 
authorised by the greenhouse gas injection licence  
– the legislation does not clarify which test of causation is to be applied in 
determining whether to indemnify the licence holder. The selected test will be 
particularly relevant where there are multiple contributors to the loss or harm 
suffered. 
– the indemnity is limited to the carrying out of operations authorised by the 
licence. Therefore, it appears that any operations not authorised by the 
license,234 for example storage of carbon dioxide outside of the approved 
project boundary or storage of carbon dioxide which is not of the approved 
origin or purity, will not fall within the indemnity of the Commonwealth. Acts 
or omissions prior to the issue, or following the cancellation, of the injection 
licence would also be excluded. 
iv.  any additional conditions specified in the regulations  
– while these conditions have not yet been specified, this provides the 
Commonwealth with a broad discretion to further narrow the scope of this 
indemnity if it, or any future Government, chooses to do so. 
 
 
234 For the rights conferred by an injection licence, see OPGGSA Cth, s 357; PGELA Bill WA, proposed s 
62(3); PGELA Bill WA, cl 62(3). 
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It should be noted that, under this indemnity, any contractual liability will remain with the 
CCS operator as will any liability incurred under the relevant Federal and State 
environmental and health and safety legislation.235  
The extremely long timescales associated with CCS projects will generally act as a limit on 
plaintiffs being able to recover against CCS operators, given that they will need the defendant 
to still be in existence with the resources to pay any damages award.236 In response to this, 
the Commonwealth legislation includes an additional provision, in largely identical terms to s 
400 (outlined above), which has the effect of attaching liability to the Commonwealth where 
the person liable, that is the holder of the greenhouse gas injection licence, has ceased to 
exist.237 The preconditions specified above also apply to the adoption of liability by the 
Commonwealth where the person is no longer in existence. If the liability does not fall within 
those conditions then the legislation states that “the damages are irrecoverable because the 
person has ceased to exist”.238 Consequently, where the liability falls outside the scope of this 
provision the injured party will be left with no ability to recover for their harm or losses 
under the Commonwealth scheme.  
 
This Commonwealth model for dealing with liabilities has been adopted in the proposed 
Western Australian CCS bill but has otherwise been ignored throughout the other 
jurisdictions.239 As a result, there is significant uncertainty regarding the treatment of long-
term liabilities within those other jurisdictions. The International Energy Agency has reported 
that “in most [Australian jurisdictions], transfer of responsibility extends to all liabilities 
associated with a storage site (i.e including liabilities arising under the common law)”.240 
Unfortunately, the legislation does not provide the same level of clarity on this issue. One of 
the greatest concerns of private entities is the possibility that liability may be retained by the 
carbon dioxide producer or by the CCS operator in the long-term rather than being transferred 
to the State.241 In Queensland, although ownership of the gas and the pore space is said to be 
 
235 Clarke, n 211, p 195. 
236 Krupa, n 47, p 59. 
237 OPGGSA Cth, s 401. 
238 OPGGSA Cth, s 401(1)(f). 
239 PGELA Bill WA, proposed ss 69JP, 69JQ; PGELA Bill WA, cll 69JP, 69JQ. 
240 International Energy Agency (IEA), Carbon Capture and Storage: Legal and regulatory review 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/International Energy Agency, Edition Two, May 
2011) at 10.  
241 Haszeldine, n 24, p 18. 
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transferred to the Crown post-closure, the transfer of liability is not addressed and the 
Government has noted that “the issue of long-term liability remains complex”.242 In Victoria, 
where the Crown also becomes the owner of the gas and the storage formation, the legislation 
is also silent on any transfer of liability. The Victorian Government has indicated that a 
transfer of liability to the Crown will occur but has stated that it will not result in an 
indemnity for negligence during CCS operations as “common law liability remains with the 
operator”.243 Clearly, there is an urgent need for greater certainty and consistency in the 
legislation to clarify the treatment of long-term liability and in particular, to specify the 
timing and scope of any protections from liabilities which may apply.  
 
DUTY OF CARE OWED BY THE CCS AUTHORITY 
The intimate involvement of the State in the carrying out of CCS operations raises an 
interesting question in whether the State could be found to have materially contributed to any 
harm that occurs during the carrying out of the injection and storage activities.244 This, in 
turn, requires consideration of the types of duty of care that may be owed by the State in 
relation to CCS operations. 
Breach of statutory duty by the CCS authority 
Courts have been generally reluctant to determine that a duty of care is owed by statutory 
authorities in the exercise of their functions given that they: 
are often charged with responsibility for a number of statutory objectives and given an array of powers to 
accomplish them. Performing their functions within limited budgetary resources often requires the making 
of difficult policy choices and discretionary judgments.245 
 
While the State will not be held liable for economic or policy decisions, the carrying out of 
monitoring and management powers under the CCS legislation is more likely to be 
considered “operational” in character.246 A process of statutory interpretation will be required 
to determine whether the CCS legislation imposes merely discretionary powers on the 
 
242 IEA, n 241 at 72. The report comprises of government position statements from the various jurisdictions. 
243 IEA, 241 at 76. 
244 Orica Ltd v CGU Insurance Ltd [2003] NSWCA 331 at [90] per Spigelman CJ; Bendix Mintex Pty Ltd v 
Barnes (1997) 42 NSWLR 307 at 312-320; Wallaby Grip (BAE) Pty Ltd (in liq) v Macleay Area Health Service 
(1998) 17 NSWCCR 355 (CA). 
245 Crimmins v Australian Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1 at 34 per McHugh J. 
246 Sutherland SC v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424. 
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regulator or whether a statutory duty is owed. A duty of care will not arise simply because the 
statutory powers have been exercised in the past, the authority has knowledge that harm may 
result from its failure to exercise those powers, or that the exercise of its powers could 
prevent harm from occurring.247 Whether a duty is found to be owed will depend upon the 
stringency of the wording of the empowering legislation, including whether: 
 There was a statutory duty that was intended to confer a private cause of action for 
breach of that duty; 
 The authority breached the duty imposed on it by statute; 
 This breach caused the loss or injury to the plaintiff which the statutory duty was 
designed to prevent; and 
 The statutory duty was imposed for the benefit of the plaintiff, or class of persons 
including the plaintiff, rather than for the benefit of the public generally.248  
 Exercising its regulatory powers to protect the public interest, natural resources or the 
environment will not by itself be sufficient to give rise to a duty of care on the part of the 
State.249 This multi-faceted inquiry will include consideration of: 
the degree and nature of control exercised by the authority over the risk of harm that eventuated; the degree 
of vulnerability of those who depend on the proper exercise by the authority of its powers; and the 
consistency or otherwise of the asserted duty of care with the terms, scope and purpose of the relevant 
statute.250  
In its current form, Australian CCS legislation does not appear to meet the requirements for 
the existence of a statutory duty of care for affected private individuals, such as landholders 
but instead seems intended to protect the public more generally. It is possible that affected 
resource holders may have greater prospects of success given the specific provisions in the 
legislation expressly aimed at protecting their resource interests from harm or loss from CCS 
activities.  
 
Scope of the duty of care of CCS authorities 
 
247 Amaca Pty Ltd v New South Wales (2004) 132 LGERA 309 at [65] per Ipp JA. 
248 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 2111 CLR 540; Crimmins v Australian Stevedoring Industry 
Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1; X v South Australia (No 3) (2007) 97 SASR 180. 
249 Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 2111 CLR 540 at [154]. 
250  Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 2111 CLR 540 at [149]. 
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It is not clear at this early stage whether the scope of Ministerial powers relating to the 
injection phases of CCS projects will be sufficient to trigger the requisite level of control for 
State liability for any harm caused. However, the level of control of the site will increase 
significantly following the closure of the site and transfer of responsibility to the State. This 
will place the CCS authority in the unusual position of being both the regulator and controller 
for the CCS project. The exercise of the authority’s functions will place them in the position 
of an “occupier” with direct control over, and knowledge of, the state of the CCS site and 
responsibility for ongoing monitoring and verification programs.251 However, the scope of 
the duty of care of public authorities is narrower than the duty imposed on private operators. 
As the Courts have noted:  
the standard by which one decides whether a statutory authority has acted negligently is not the same as that 
applicable to a private individual or corporation, but rather is the standard of what a reasonable authority, 
with its powers and resources, would have done in all the circumstances of the case.252 
 
Accordingly, in deciding whether the CCS regulatory authority owes, or has breached, a duty 
of care, the Court will take into account that: 
 The functions required to be exercised by the authority are limited by the financial 
and other resources that are reasonably available to the authority for the purpose of 
exercising the functions; 
 The functions required to be exercised by the authority are to be decided by reference 
to the broad range of its activities; and 
 The authority may rely on evidence of its compliance with its general procedures, and 
any applicable standards, as evidence of the proper exercise of its functions.253 
Consequently, public authorities will be able to rely on evidence of limited financial and 
other resources within the context of their broad range of responsibilities in demonstrating 
that they responded reasonably to the risk.254 In relation to the resources of the authority, the 
Court will consider: 
 
251 Modbury Triangle Shopping Centre Pty Ltd v Anzil (2000) 205 CLR 254; [2000] HCA 61 at [18]; Australian 
Safeway Stores Pty Ltd v Zaluzna (1987) 162 CLR 479 at 488 per Mason, Wilson, Deane and Dawson JJ. 
252 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; [2009] 
NSWCA 263 at [265].  
253 Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 35; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 83; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5W. 
254 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; [2009] 
NSWCA 263 at [210]. 
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the magnitude of the risk and the degree of probability that it will occur, the expense, difficulty and 
inconvenience to the authority in taking the steps described… to alleviate the danger, and any other 
competing or conflicting responsibility or commitments of the authority. The duty does not extend to 
ensuring the safety of [all persons] in all circumstances.255 
Accordingly, evidence will be required of the authority’s overall budget, the state of its 
assets, its budgetary allocations to other works and projects256 and annual expenditure on 
monitoring and verification of CCS sites in the context of the many other functions of the 
authority.257 The Court will also take into account the necessary time periods needed for the 
public authority to place itself in a financial position to make expenditures to address the 
risks from these sites, particularly where new types of risk are involved.258 Together, these 
matters may result in a decision of the Court that a duty of care is not owed to injured 
landholders or affected resource holders, or that the authority’s failure to avoid the risks to 
those persons was not a breach of duty, in the context of the significant costs involved in 
managing these CCS sites and the authority’s limited resources and broader range of 
responsibilities. This is one possible outcome. However, it should be noted that current CCS 
legislation, to varying extents, requires the CCS operator to pay the long-term monitoring and 
verification costs for these CCS projects. The availability of this security and other CCS 
related payments (discussed in more detail below) would also be taken into account in 
assessing the resources available to the CCS regulatory authority in carrying out its various 
functions.259 In this context, CCS authorities may not be able to claim that the discharge of 
their functions has been adversely affected by the unavailability of financial or other 
resources making it less likely that they would be relieved of their duty of care in the carrying 
out of CCS activities.260  
 
Security, insurance and other statutory payments 
 
255 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512 at 577-578, 580-581 per Gaudron, McHugh and 
Gummow JJ.  
256 Liverpool City Council v Turano (2008) 164 LGERA 16 at 43 per Beazley JA.  
257 Liverpool City Council v Turano (2008) 164 LGERA 16 at 42 per Beazley JA.  
258 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; [2009] 
NSWCA 263 at [282]. 
259 Road and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Ltd (2009) 77 NSWLR 360; [2009] 
NSWCA 263 at [393]. 
260 Port Stephens Council v Theodorakakis [2006] NSWCA 70 at [17] per Bryson JA; Sami v Roads 
Corporation (Vic) (2008) 51 MVR 118 at 150. 
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CCS operators must pay an annual fee,261 annual rent262 and/or a royalty on the volume of 
carbon dioxide injected into a storage formation within the licence area.263 A CCS operator is 
also liable to compensate an owner or occupier of private land for any compensatable 
effect,264 or any loss or damage,265 caused by the sequestration operations. This will include 
damage to the surface of the land (only),266 dimunition of the value of the land267 and 
consequential damages.268 In Queensland and Western Australia, compensation for future 
liability is negotiated with the CCS operator prior to access and in Queensland is based on the 
Government’s Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement.269 In Victoria, a CCS 
operator cannot carry out any activity until a compensation agreement has been entered into 
with the holder of resource authority for a resource that is likely to be contaminated or 
sterilised.270 Compensation is required for any loss or damage to the resource, including for 
deprivation of access to the resource or loss of opportunity to recover or use the resource.271 
Most jurisdictions impose obligations on the CCS operator to provide security and/or other 
forms of financial assurance, such as a rehabilitation bond, to the State.272 This is generally 
required prior to the issue of the relevant greenhouse gas injection licences and 
environmental authorities. The proposed Western Australian CCS bill is currently an 
exception to this general trend and does not require security or another form of financial 
assurance to be provided by a CCS operator. In other jurisdictions, the total amount of 
security required is at the Minister’s discretion.273 In Queensland a minimum amount is 
 
261 Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Annual Fees) Act 2006 (Cth), s 4A; EPA Qld, s 316; 
Environmental Protection Regulation 2008 (Qld), r 120(1)(b)(i); OPGGSA Vic, s 689; PGERA WA, proposed s 
138; PGELA Bill WA, cl 138. 
262 GGSA Qld, s 168(1); Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulation 2010 (Qld), Sch 1; GGGSA Vic, s 227, where the 
project is located on Crown land. 
263 GGGSA Vic, s 224(1); OPGGSA Vic, s 694. 
264 GGSA Qld, s 320(1). 
265 GGGSA Vic, s 201(1); PGERA WA, proposed s 18; PGELA Bill WA, cl 18. 
266 GGSA Qld, s 320(4); GGGSA Vic, s 201(1)(b); PGERA WA, proposed ss 17(2), 18; PGELA Bill WA, cll 
17(2), 18.  
267 GGSA Qld, s 320(4)(a)(ii); GGGSA Vic, s 201(1)(g); PGERA WA, proposed s 18; PGELA Bill WA, cl 18. 
268 GGSA Qld, s 320(4)(c); PGERA WA, proposed ss 17(2), 18; PGELA Bill WA, cll 17(2), 18. 
269 PGERA WA, proposed s 20; PGELA Bill WA, cl 20; GGSA Qld, s 321(3); Queensland Government, 
Department of Mines and Energy, Standard Conduct and Compensation Agreement (27 August 2010) at cll 
13.1, 14.2. These agreements bind successors in title to the land and the holder of the greenhouse gas authority: 
GGSA Qld, s 325E. 
270 GGGSA Vic, s 104. 
271 GGGSA Vic, s 105. 
272 OPGGSA Cth, ss 364(c), 372(c); OPGGSA Vic, ss 387(c), 397(c); GGSA Qld, s 271(1); EPA Qld, s 312O. 
In Victoria, a ‘rehabilitation bond’ must be secured for any rehabilitation work, clean-up work or pollution 
prevention work that may be necessary as a result of the CCS operation, but does not include any costs 
associated with long-term monitoring or verification: GGGSA Vic, s 219. 
273 OPGGSA Cth, ss 454(1)(d), 454(2)(e); GGGSA Vic, s 220; OPGGSA Vic, s 462(4)(a). 
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specified.274 Most jurisdictions allow the Minister to increase the amount of security at any 
time,275 if satisfied that the existing security is insufficient.276 Security provided may be used 
to pay any liability the State incurs under the CCS legislation because of an act or omission 
of the holder,277 amounts payable under the Act,278 costs of rehabilitation work, clean-up 
work or pollution prevention work,279 and costs of carrying out work to rehabilitate land.280 In 
Queensland, security may also be applied to compensation payments by the State because of 
the exercise or purported exercise of a remedial power under the legislation.281  
It should also be noted that the Victorian, Western Australian and Commonwealth CCS 
frameworks require the CCS operator to hold sufficient insurance against expenses and 
liabilities arising out of the carrying out of operations under the injection lease or licence282 
including the costs of compliance with remedial directions.283 Insurance policies are currently 
available for CCS in respect of operational activities relating to bodily injury and property 
damage but insurance is not currently available for all other losses, including long-term 
liabilities.284 This is primarily owing to the uncertainty surrounding the quantum of risk 
surrounding those future losses.285 
 
Additional statutory protections for the State and its agents 
In addition to the limited scope of the duty of care, there are also a number of broad 
protections provided to public authorities and their authorised agents under some CCS 
legislation which would act as a limit on liability to injured third parties. Under the 
Commonwealth and Victorian offshore legislation the Minister, authority and their agents are 
 
274 GGSA Qld, s 271(2)(b); Greenhouse Gas Storage Regulation 2010 (Qld), s 32(2)(b). 
275 GGSA Qld, s 272(1); OPGGSA Cth, s 454(1); GGGSA Vic, s 221; EPA Qld, s 312(3); OPGGSA Vic, s 
489(1). 
276 OPGGSA Cth, s 454(1); GGGSA Vic, s 221; OPGGSA Vic, s 489(1). The authority must be satisfied it is 
justified having regard to the degree of risk of environmental harm: EPA Qld, s 312O(3). 
277 GGSA Qld, s 270(2). 
278 GGSA Qld, s 270(2). 
279 GGGSA Vic, s 219; EPA Qld, s 312O(2). 
280 EPA Qld, s 312O(2).  
281 GGSA Qld, s 270(2). 
282 OPGGSA Cth, s 571(3); GGGSA Vic, s 218; OPGGSA Vic, s 620(1); PGERA WA, proposed s 91A; 
PGELA Bill WA, cl 91A. 
283OPGGSA Cth, s 571(3); GGGSA Vic, s 218; OPGGSA Vic, s 620(1); PGERA WA proposed, s 91A; PGELA 
Bill WA, cl 91A. 
284 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report on the Technical Workshop on 
Modalities and Procedures for Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage in Geological Formations as Clean 
Development Mechanism Project Activities, Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice, 35th Session, 
Durban, FCCC/SBSTA/2011/INF.14 (8 November 2011) at [23]. 
285 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, n 285.  
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broadly protected from any action, suit or proceeding for, or in relation to, an act or matter, in 
good faith, done or omitted to be done in the exercise, or purported exercise, of any power or 
authority conferred by the CCS legislation; regulations; or a direction under the legislation.286 
The proposed Western Australian bill also contains a protection against actions in tort for 
persons acting in good faith for anything done, or omitted to be done, in the performance or 
purported performance of a function under the Act.287 This protection extends to public 
bodies.288 However, the proposed bill notes that this protection does not relieve the State of 
any liability that it might have for another person as a result of the acts or omissions, in good 
faith, in the performance of functions under the Act.289  
Similar protections for acts or omissions in good faith are not included in the Queensland or 
Victorian onshore legislation. However, the Queensland legislation does provide protection 
from civil liability to the Minister, public servants and other designated persons acting with 
the authority of the State for acts done, or omitted, honestly and without negligence under the 
CCS legislation.290 In those circumstances, the civil liability of those persons attaches instead 
to the State.291  
 
LIABILITY FOR LEAKAGES UNDER THE CARBON PRICING MECHANISM 
Unlike the approach under the European Union emissions trading scheme, under the 
Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism no carbon permits are issued for carbon dioxide 
sequestered through a CCS project.292 Instead, in Australia, CCS is treated as a mechanism 
for reducing carbon pricing liabilities. Liable entities, such as coal fired power plants, are 
liable to surrender permits for each tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent emissions.293 They are 
able to reduce those liabilities by transferring their emissions for sequestration using CCS. 
The estimate of emissions under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 
(Cth) (NGER Act) allows for a deduction of the amount of carbon dioxide captured if the 
captured carbon dioxide is intended for permanent storage in underground geological 
 
286 OPGGSA Cth, s 768; OPGGSA Vic, s 787. 
287 PGERA WA, proposed ss 119A(1), (4); PGELA Bill WA, cll 119A(1), (4). 
288 Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 5. 
289 PGERA WA, proposed ss 119A(3), (4); PGELA Bill WA, cll 119A(3), (4). 
290 GGSA Qld, s 425. 
291 GGSA Qld, s 425. 
292 Under the EU ETS, CCS operators are allocated permits but must surrender permits for any carbon leakage 
from the CCS project. This places CCS operators in the unusual position of addressing a liability risk that 
increases over time, as the market price of permits increases. See Haszeldine, n 24, p 18. 
293 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), s 4. 
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formations and the carbon dioxide is captured by, or transferred to, a “relevant person”.294 
Carbon dioxide is captured for permanent storage only if it is captured by, or transferred to 
the holder of a greenhouse gas injection licence/lease or approval under the Commonwealth, 
State or Territory CCS legislation (the “relevant person”).295 The relevant person must issue 
the liable entity with a written certificate specifying: 
 The amount of carbon dioxide that was transferred; 
 The volume of the carbon dioxide stream containing the transferred carbon dioxide; 
and 
 The concentration of carbon dioxide in the stream.296 
The scheme does not currently allow for deductions if the carbon dioxide is transferred to a 
third party intermediary.297  
Provided the above conditions are met, liable entities will be able to reduce their liabilities for 
greenhouse gas emissions by transferring their emissions for permanent storage. But what if 
the transferred emissions are not stored permanently by the CCS operator? What will be the 
legal implications for any loss of sequestered carbon dioxide under the NGER Act or Carbon 
Pricing Mechanism?  
 
CCS: The duty to report leakages under the NGER Act? 
The NGER Act specifies the circumstances in which an entity is required to report on its 
annual greenhouse gas emissions including where the trigger threshold has been met for the 
financial year.298 The NGER Act relates only to duties to report, no additional responsibilities 
are imposed in relation to the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Currently, that trigger 
threshold will be met where the total greenhouse gases emitted from a group of facilities has 
 
294 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (Measurement) Determination 2008 (Cth) ( NGER 
Determination 2008), s 1.19B; Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water, Senator the 
Honourable Penny Wong, “Explanatory statement, Issued by the Authority of the National Greenhouse and 
Energy Reporting (Measurement) Amendment Determination 2010 (No. 1)” (Australian Government, 2010) at 
3, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/government/initiatives/national-greenhouse-energy-
reporting/publications/explanatory-statement-nger-amendment-determination-2010.aspx viewed 20 January 
2012. 
295 NGER Determination 2008, s 1.19A. 
296 NGER Determination 2008, s 1.19B; the amount of captured carbon dioxide must be estimated in accordance 
with s 1.19E and the carbon dioxide stream must be sampled in accordance with ISO 10715:1997, or an 
equivalent standard on at least a monthly basis. 
297 Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water, Senator the Honourable Penny Wong, n 295 at 3. 
298 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth) (NGER Act), s 12. 
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a carbon dioxide equivalence of 50 kilotonnes or more; or where an individual member of the 
group operates a facility that causes emissions with a carbon dioxide equivalence of 25 
kilotonnes or more.299 However, under consequential amendments made for the passage of 
the Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), greenhouse gas emissions will not be included in this 
trigger threshold unless the Minister has determined methods or criteria by which the 
emissions are to be measured.300  
If the trigger requirements are met during any reporting year then the CCS operator would be 
required to report on the opening and closing stock of sequestered carbon dioxide, including 
the captured and injected amounts.301 Any emissions that have occurred during the 
transportation, injection and storage operations would also be required in the operator’s 
report.302 To date, Ministerial determinations extend only to fugitive emissions arising from 
the transport of carbon dioxide captured for permanent storage.303 As has been acknowledged 
by the Federal Government, “currently the NGER Measurement Determination does not 
specify methods for the estimation of carbon dioxide captured and stored or for the emissions 
associated with these activities”.304 Accordingly, under the current statutory requirements, 
CCS operators would be required to report only on emissions associated with the transport of 
carbon dioxide to the storage site.305 In its current form, CCS operators would not be required 
to report on any loss of carbon stocks from their injection or storage activities under the 
NGER Act. 
 
CCS: Liable entities under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism? 
This absence of determined methods or criteria for addressing emissions from the injection 
and storage of carbon dioxide also has implications for the application of the Clean Energy 
Act to CCS projects. An entity will be a liable entity under the Clean Energy Act only where:  
 
299 NGER Act, s 13. 
300 NGER Act, new s 13(1A) to come into effect on 1 July 2012. 
301 National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Regulations 2008 (Cth) (NGER Regulations), r 4.12. 
302 NGER Regulations, r 4.12(3). 
303 Current methodology determinations for “2M Carbon capture and storage” address Method 1 — emissions 
from transport of carbon dioxide involving transfer and Method 2 — emissions from transport of carbon dioxide 
not involving transfer: NGER Determination 2008, ss 3.91 – 3.92. 
304 Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water, Senator the Honourable Penny Wong, n 295 at 2.  
305 Minister for Climate Change, Energy Efficiency and Water, Senator the Honourable Penny Wong, n 295, pp 
2-3.  
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 It is a facility under the operational control of a person throughout an eligible financial 
year; and 
 The total amount of covered emissions from the operation of the facility during the 
eligible financial year was 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide.306 
 A covered emission is a scope 1 emission of greenhouse gas from the operation of a 
facility (facility being defined under amendments to the NGER Act to include the 
activity of CCS),307 provided that:  
 The greenhouse gas is released into the atmosphere in Australia as a direct result of 
the operation of the facility; and 
 The Minister has determined methods or criteria by which the emissions are to be 
measured under the NGER Act.308 
There are currently no determined methods or criteria for emissions from carbon injection or 
storage operations although it is hoped that future work is underway to correct this. The 
Government has made it clear that CCS is not intended to be exempt from the Clean Energy 
Scheme.309 However, even if methods are in place for calculating CCS emissions, the 
operator must also have triggered the threshold test of 250,000 tonnes of carbon dioxide 
equivalent in a financial year before accountability under the Clean Energy Act will apply.  
This approach has created a legal environment where a liable entity is able to reduce their 
liability under the Clean Energy Scheme by transferring their emissions to CCS without any 
equivalent accountability being placed on the CCS operator for any losses of those emissions. 
CCS facilities with insidious leaks that do not meet the 250,000 tonnes pa threshold, whether 
they be under the control of the State or CCS operator at the time, currently face no legal 
repercussions under Australia’s Clean Energy Scheme for their release of those emissions to 
the atmosphere. This seems a counterproductive and highly unsatisfactory approach to 
addressing CCS under the Carbon Pricing Mechanism.  
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
306 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), s 20(4). 
307 NGER Regulations, r 2.32(2); NGER Act, s 7, new definition of activity and carbon capture and storage. 
These amendments will take effect on 1 July 2012.  
308 Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth), s 30(1). 
309 Explanatory Memorandum, Clean Energy Act 2011 (Cth) p 53. 
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It has been stated that the “greatest global challenge facing CCS today is not technology, but 
the uncertainty of where policy and regulation is going”.310 The threat of uncertain liability 
costs alongside the high capital costs associated with CCS technology, pose a significant 
barrier to commercial investors worldwide.311 There have been calls by many commentators 
for a clear legislative framework to resolve the “critical and unique” issues of ownership and 
liability associated with the long-term geological storage of carbon dioxide.312 This article 
has undertaken a critical review of a number of key Australian CCS legal frameworks and 
has highlighted the significant uncertainty surrounding the ownership of the sequestered 
carbon dioxide and pore space, particularly during injection and prior to site closure. It is 
clear that further reform is required to address these uncertainties. There are also significant 
uncertainties associated with the transfer of liability to the State including the nature of 
liability to be transferred, the scope of any indemnities provided and the timing for the 
provision of any legal protections. 
Liabilities associated with control over CCS operations, and the interactions between the 
CCS operator and the State, are another significant matter requiring legal clarification. This 
article has identified the broad range of ministerial directions available to the State, including 
for “serious situations”, allowing the State to mandate the manner in which the CCS operator 
is permitted to conduct their injection activities. The legal liabilities of the State for its actions 
across the CCS life cycle are ambiguous. It appears that claims are more likely to be brought 
against the State in the long-term, given that the CCS operator is likely to no longer be in 
existence or possess sufficient resources to satisfy any Court award. However, the State is 
subject to a number of statutory protections from liability in relation to its limited resources. 
Reliance on breach of statutory duty by injured individuals also appears unlikely given the 
difficulties in demonstrating that the legislation is designed for the protection of specific 
classes of persons. This is in addition to the substantial evidentiary difficulties faced by 
injured plaintiffs in proving a causative link between the harm suffered and the migration of 
the stored carbon dioxide from the storage site. Overall, it appears that these matters will 
place substantial limits on the ability of affected individuals to seek any meaningful redress 
for harm caused as a result of CCS operations, particularly in the longer term.  
 
310 Shilling, n 15, p 35. 
311 Global CCS Institute, The Global Status of CCS: 2011 (2011) at 71; Flatt, n 11 at 220. 
312 LoBaugh, n 37, p 71; Shilling, n 15, p 35. 
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This article has also examined where potential liability for leakage from CCS projects will 
rest under the new Carbon Pricing Mechanism. It has concluded that Australia’s key 
mechanism for achieving emission reductions does not currently extend to CCS operators, 
despite liable entities being permitted to reduce their liable emissions under the legislation in 
return for the transfer of emissions for permanent storage. This loophole should be addressed 
as a matter of urgency and proper accountability should be imposed for all leakages from 
CCS projects within Australia. 
 
